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ESPINOZA V. MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE:
PULLING BACK THE CURTAIN ON TAX
EXPENDITURE SPENDING
Katy Lindberg*

I. INTRODUCTION
Milton Friedman’s essay, The Role of Government in Education, popularized the concept of allowing the free market to dictate where parents send
their children to school.1 A free market, Friedman argued, would create
competition for public education funds, thus driving schools to increase academic standards to compete for those funds.2 As Friedman predicted, some
parents have rejected public education and have turned to private schools to
educate their children.3 In the early 1990s, the modern school choice movement began to take form, and many states began adopting voucher programs.4 Voucher programs allow parents to “direct” state funds to a private
school of the parents’ choice.5 Although there are many reasons to send a
* Katy Lindberg, J.D. Candidate, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana 2021. I would like to thank Professor Pippa Browde and Professor Anthony Johnstone for their
mentorship and guidance throughout the writing of this paper, and throughout law school.
1. Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 4, 123–144 (Robert A. Solo ed., 1955), https://perma.cc/M4WX-F7T2.
2. Id.
3. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, School Choice in the United States: 2019, at 20, https://perma.cc/
TAH8-MGEJ (last visited Oct. 26, 2020). In the fall of 2015, 5.8 million students attended private
schools, accounting for approximately 10.2% of all elementary and secondary school enrollment.
4. Adam Mengler, Public Dollars, Private Discrimination: Protecting LGBT Students from School
Voucher Discrimination, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1251, 1258 (2018).
5. Julie F. Mead, The Right to an Education or the Right to Shop for Schooling: Examining
Voucher Programs in Relation to State Constitutional Guarantees, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 703, 706
(2015).
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child to a private school, religious education is a priority for many parents.6
As the public school system has become increasingly secular, the demand
for religious education has grown among religious adherents who oppose
the secularization of public education and want a faith-based education for
their children.7 Many of these parents look to state governments to help
offset the cost.8 Today, around 90% of states have some variety of a statesupported school choice program.9 These programs must follow the protections guaranteed by the Establishment Clause, Free Exercise Clause, and
state constitutions.
The Montana Legislature enacted its school choice program in 2015
through offering a tax credit.10 The Tax Credit Program (“Program”) provides a tax credit for donations to private school scholarship funds.11 The
Legislature required the Montana Department of Revenue (“Department”)
to administer the tax credit in “compliance with . . . Article X, Section 6 of
the Montana Constitution,”12 which prohibits the state from aiding religious
schools.13
The Legislature’s enactment of the Program was unprecedented in
Montana tax law. The Program provided a dollar-for-dollar tax credit that
capped at $3 million per year, increasing by 10% each year the cap is met.14
The Legislature referred to this as a “tax replacement program.”15 To comply with the Legislature’s guidance, the Department issued an administrative rule prohibiting religious schools from receiving aid.16 Parents seeking
6. Nicole Stelle Garnett, Post-Accountability Accountability, 52 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 157, 200
(2018). In 2015, over 67% of private schools were religiously affiliated, and 76% of students enrolled in
private schools attended a religious school. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, supra note 3, at 20.
7. Brad J. Davidson, Comment, Balancing Parental Choice, State Interest, and the Establishment
Clause: Constitutional Guidelines for States’ School-Choice Legislation, 33 TEX. TECH L. REV. 435,
437 (2002).
8. Id.
9. Scholarship Tax Credits, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, https://perma.cc/
NY2Q-ZXEQ (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (explaining that seventeen states have scholarship tax credit
programs in 2017); Josh Cunningham, School Vouchers, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES
(Dec. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/C3FA-E9J3 (explaining that twenty-seven states have school voucher
programs); Benjamin Olneck-Brown, Charter Schools: Overview, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Mar. 1, 2019) https://perma.cc/4G64-9RRF (explaining that forty-three states have charter
school programs).
10. See infra Parts II(A) and II(B).
11. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-30-3111(1) (2019).
12. Id. § 15-30-3101.
13. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6.
14. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-30-3111(5)(a) (2019).
15. Id. § 15-30-3101.
16. ADMIN. R. MONT. 42.4.802. See also infra Part II(C) (discussing the Department’s enactment of
Rule 1).
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scholarships for their children to attend a religious school sued to enjoin the
Department.17
In Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, the Montana Supreme Court, faced with the Program’s unique characteristics, found the
effect of the tax credit was to subsidize private religious schools.18 This
subsidy was unconstitutional under Article X, Section 6 of the Montana
Constitution.19 Although the Court’s application of Article X, Section 6 was
overturned by the United States Supreme Court,20 the Montana Supreme
Court’s definition of a tax credit still stands.21
A tax credit, like the one created by the Program, is a form of tax
expenditure.22 Tax expenditures are a popular alternative to direct spending
measures but face far less scrutiny.23 Because tax expenditures are often not
thought of as spending provisions, but as tax cuts,24 most tax expenditures
are not subject to annual or bi-annual scrutiny.25 In reality, tax expenditures
cost the state hundreds of millions of dollars in diverted tax revenue per
year and create administrative costs.26 Unlike direct spending measures, tax
expenditures silently siphon money from the general fund by decreasing tax
revenue.27 Tax expenditures are an important tool for legislative bodies, yet
the provisions should be subject to the same review as any other spending
measure.
The Montana Supreme Court’s analysis of the Program demonstrates
this principle, reflecting why tax expenditures should be treated not as tax
cuts but as government subsidies. By defining a tax expenditure as an indirect payment, the Montana Supreme Court pulled back the curtain on tax
expenditure spending. Its analysis exposed the Program’s true economic
17. Complaint ¶¶ 7–9, Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 2015 WL 13821199 (D. Mont. Dec.
16, 2015) (No. DV-15-1152). See also infra Part II(C) (discussing the Rule 1 litigation).
18. Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 435 P.3d 603, 612–14 (Mont. 2018). See also infra
Part II(C)(1) (summarizing the Montana Supreme Court’s decision).
19. Id. at 614–15.
20. Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2256–2263 (2020).
21. Id. at 2254.
22. STEPHANIE HUNTER MCMAHON, PRINCIPLES OF TAX POLICY 473–75 (2d ed. 2018).
23. Michael Leachman, Dylan Grundman & Nicholas Johnson, Promoting State Budget Accountability Through Tax Expenditure Reporting, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (May 24, 2011),
https://perma.cc/KME4-R849.
24. MCMAHON, supra note 22, at 474.
25. Leachman, Grundman & Johnson, supra note 23.
26. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 2018 Biennial Report: Tax Expenditures, 275, 281–82 [hereinafter
Biennial Report]; Where is the Money Going? It is Time to Look at Montana’s Tax Expenditures, MONTANA BUDGET & POLICY CENTER (Aug. 2019), https://perma.cc/5YZF-F7KX [hereinafter Where is the
Money Going?].
27. What Are Tax Expenditures?, TAX POLICY CENTER (May 2020), https://perma.cc/N5CG-SUPD
[hereinafter What Are Tax Expenditures?].
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cost and revealed the Legislature’s attempt to avoid the prohibitions of Article X, Section 6.
This Note is organized as follows: Part II provides background on
school choice policy, including Montana’s school tax credit program, and
discusses the constitutional challenges school choice programs face under
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment to the federal Constitution.
Part II then discusses the Montana State Constitution’s No-Aid Clause, its
complex background, and the Montana Department of Revenue’s attempt to
administer the Program in accordance with the No-Aid Clause through the
Department’s promulgation of Rule 1. Part II concludes by setting out the
legal challenge to the Department’s Rule 1, the Montana Supreme Court’s
holding that the Program was unconstitutional, and the United States Supreme Court’s overturning of the Montana Supreme Court’s decision. Part
III begins with an explanation of the function and effect of tax expenditures,
and the reasons policymakers use tax expenditures. Part III then discusses
the criticisms of legislative bodies’ heavy reliance on tax expenditures.
Next, Part III discusses how the Montana Supreme Court’s novel interpretation of a tax credit as an indirect payment was correct given current tax
expenditure spending trends and tax credits’ fiscal reality. Finally, Part IV
argues for a shift in thinking regarding tax expenditures and urges public
policymakers to treat tax expenditures like appropriations, subject to the
same scrutiny as direct spending measures.
II. BACKGROUND
A. School Choice
Since the early 1990s, school choice programs have proliferated across
the country.28 School choice programs function by diverting public education funds to private schools, allowing the funds to “follow” students to a
school of their parent’s choice.29 There are various approaches to school
choice: charter schools30 and school voucher programs are prevalent nationwide;31 however, scholarship tax credit programs are becoming a popular
alternative.32 Tax credit programs incentivize taxpayers to donate to schol28. Garnett, supra note 6, at 159–160.
29. What is School Choice?, EDCHOICE, https://perma.cc/N6BD-CAVL (last visited Oct. 17, 2020).
30. Benjamin Olneck-Brown, Charter Schools: Overview, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Mar. 1, 2019) https://perma.cc/4G64-9RRF.
31. Josh Cunningham, School Vouchers, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 1,
2016), https://perma.cc/C3FA-E9J3.
32. Scholarship Tax Credits, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, https://perma.cc/
NY2Q-ZXEQ (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (showing that seventeen states had scholarship tax credit
programs in 2017); What is a Tax-Credit Scholarship?, EDCHOICE, https://perma.cc/NZM8-L7AC (last
visited Oct. 10, 2020) (showing that, as of 2020, eighteen states have scholarship tax credit programs).
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arship funds by supplying a tax credit for their donations.33 The scholarship
funds then provide parents with tuition aid for private schools, many of
which are religious.34
During the 2015 legislative session, the Montana Legislature enacted
the Program,35 providing taxpayers with a dollar-for-dollar tax credit of up
to $150 per year for a donation to a Student Scholarship Organization
(“SSO”).36 With these donations, the SSO grants scholarships to children
attending a Qualified Education Provider.37 The Program prohibits a taxpayer from directing funds to a specific student or school.38 Instead, the
SSO takes the contribution, awards a scholarship to a student, and pays the
scholarship directly to the student’s school.39 Although a parent cannot donate $150 and direct it to go to their child, the parent can donate $150,
receive a $150 tax credit, be awarded a $150 scholarship by an SSO, reducing their tuition burden.40
After receiving a donation, the SSO pays a Qualified Education Provider on behalf of a student.41 A Qualified Education Provider must be a
private school and must follow certain requirements to receive funds under
the Program, including maintaining accreditation, meeting health and safety
standards, and administering standardized tests.42 Only one SSO, Big Sky
Scholarships, has been formed under the Program.43 Out of ten schools receiving scholarships under Big Sky Scholarships, nine are religiously affiliated.44
School choice programs have been fully embraced by parents seeking
a religious education for their children.45 The United States Supreme Court
has long recognized that a parent has the right to choose where their child
receives an education and shepherd their child’s “religious upbringing” by
sending them to a religious school.46 Given that public schools have be33. Garnett, supra note 6, at 170.
34. Id.
35. S. 410, 2015 Leg., 64th Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2015).
36. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-30-3111(1) (2019).
37. Id. § 15-30-3104(1).
38. Id. § 15-30-3111(1).
39. Id. § 15-30-3104(1).
40. Id. § 15-30-3104(1). See also Montana Dep’t of Revenue, Fiscal Note, S. 410, 2015 Leg., 64th
Reg. Sess. at 2, https://perma.cc/6X7Z-GEEZ [hereinafter “Fiscal Note”]. This is in addition to any
federal charitable contribution tax credit.
41. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-30-3104(1) (2019).
42. Id. § 15-30-3102(7).
43. See Montana Education Donations Portal, https://perma.cc/B884-FSP7 (last visited Oct. 10,
2020).
44. BIG SKY SCHOLARSHIPS, https://perma.cc/8W5F-YU4U (last visited Oct. 10, 2020).
45. Davidson, supra note 7.
46. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213–14 (1972); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534–35 (1925).
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come increasingly secular, many parents want their children to learn in an
environment that intertwines education with religion.47 Parents may also
want to avoid topics taught in public schools, like evolution or sex education, that conflict with their religious beliefs.48 That said, the religious nature of many private schools may create constitutional issues when the
schools receive state funding or subsidies through school choice programs.
B. Constitutional Limits of State Support for Religious Education
This subsection first summarizes the challenges faced by school choice
programs under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. The subsection then discusses state limits on school choice, including Montana’s NoAid Clause. The origins of Article X, Section 6, and its inclusion in the
1972 Constitution are also discussed.
1. Religion Clauses
School choice programs have been challenged under both the Establishment and the Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, but rarely
were the cases clear cut. Many school choice programs fall between “the
joints” of what the Establishment Clause forbids and the Free Exercise
Clause mandates.49
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits a state or
the federal government from enacting a law that has “the ‘purpose’ or ‘effect’ of advancing or inhibiting religion.[50]” Historically, the Court applied
the Lemon test to determine whether a law violated the Establishment
Clause;51 however, the current Court has “shelved” this test and might narrow its scope further in the near future.52 Under current Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, a school choice program does not violate the Estab47. Davidson, supra note 7, at 437.
48. Id. at 437–38.
49. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019–20 (2017) (quoting
Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004)).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 648–49 (2002).
51. Under the Lemon test, a law violates the Establishment Clause when it (1) does not “clearly
reflect a secular legislative purpose,” (2) “advances” or “inhibits” religion, and (3) excessively “entangles” the government with religion. Comm. for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 772–73 (1973) (internal citations omitted).
52. But see American Legion v. American Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2102 (2019) (Gorsuch,
J., concurring) (stating that the Lemon test is “now shelved”); see also Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of
Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2264 (2020). (Thomas, J., concurring to argue the Establishment Clause only
applies against the federal government, and is only intended to prevent religious “coercion” or forced
“financial support” of religion).
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lishment Clause if the program is “neutral” with respect to religion or if aid
goes to a religious school based only on parental choice.53
For example, a Minnesota law allowing taxpayers to deduct their children’s educational expenses from their state income taxes was upheld by
the United States Supreme Court, even though 95% of the beneficiaries sent
their children to religious schools.54 The Court explained that the Minnesota
law neutrally benefitted parents of both religiously and non-religiously educated children.55 The Court also found the program only aided religious
schools because of a parent’s independent choice to send their children to a
religious school.56
School choice programs also face Free Exercise Clause challenges.57
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment bars state and federal
governments from “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion.58 The Supreme Court has found a state violates the Free Exercise Clause when it
denies a generally available, non-religious benefit to an individual or group
solely because of their religious affiliation.59 Still, when a state has a substantial interest in not funding a religious pursuit, or when the recipient is
using the aid for religious use, the state may decline aid under the Free
Exercise Clause.60
In Locke v. Davey, the Supreme Court held a publicly funded Washington State scholarship program could refuse aid to a student seeking a
devotional theology degree to become a minister.61 The State had a substantial interest in not funding students’ theological education, and the Court
found the State’s compelling interest to not aid churches under the Establishment Clause outweighed the student’s rights under the Free Exercise
Clause.62 The student in Locke “was denied a scholarship because of what
53. See Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2254. See also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 397–99 (1983) (a tax
deduction program, primarily used by parents of children attending religious schools, did not violate the
Establishment Clause because the program neutrally benefitted parents of children attending religious
and non-religious schools, and because the funds only benefitted religious schools because of parental
choice); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993) (a religious school could receive
a government benefit when the benefit was neutral, and when the school received the benefit solely
because of the parent’s choice); Zelman, 536 U.S. at 653 (following Mueller and Zobrest to uphold a
school voucher program that neutrally benefitted religious and nonreligious schools, and that only
benefitted religious schools because of a parent’s choice).
54. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 390–91.
55. Id. at 397.
56. Id. at 399.
57. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 (2017); Locke v.
Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004).
58. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
59. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2019–21; Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 533, 542–43 (1993).
60. Locke, 540 U.S. at 725.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 722–25.
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he proposed to do—use the funds to prepare for the ministry,” not because
of his religious status.63
The current Court’s more recent Free Exercise jurisprudence suggests
that Locke is an anomaly, however.64 In Trinity Lutheran, the Missouri Department of Natural Resources’ decision to deny Trinity Lutheran Church
preschool and daycare center a grant providing funding for a rubber playground surface violated the Free Exercise Clause.65 The Court found Missouri had discriminated against Trinity Lutheran because it denied the
church neutral aid solely based on its religious status.66 According to the
Court, Missouri had forced Trinity Lutheran to choose between its religious
practice and receiving the grant.67
2. Montana’s No-Aid Clause
School choice programs may also face challenges under state constitutions. A state’s constitution could traditionally create more separation of
church and state than the First Amendment.68 To accomplish this, many
state constitutions contain a no-aid clause. Historically, the Montana Constitution contained one of the strongest no-aid provisions in the country.69
Article X, Section 6 of the Montana Constitution prohibited the use of “any
direct or indirect appropriation or payment from any public fund or monies”
to benefit a religious purpose or organization.70
States began prohibiting religious schools from receiving state funding
in the mid-1820s.71 In 1835, Michigan was the first state to add a no-aid
provision to its constitution,72 and several states followed suit.73 States’
early efforts to limit state funding in religious education stemmed from a
63. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2023–24.
64. See Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2257–58, 2262–63 (2020) (explaining that Locke created a “narrow restriction” allowing states to prohibit funds to be used for “religious use”); see also Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2023 (following this reasoning).
65. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2017, 2021–22.
66. Id. at 2024 n.3.
67. Id. at 2024.
68. This maxim has been called into question by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2260.
69. Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 435 P.3d 603, 610 n.3 (Mont. 2018) (citing 6 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT 2008, 2011 (1972) available at http://
perma.cc/5ZWU-XQUL [hereinafter 6 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT]). In Espinoza, 140
S. Ct. at 2262–63, the United States Supreme Court held Montana’s No-Aid Clause violated the Free
Exercise Clause, and the provision is no longer valid.
70. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6(1).
71. Steven K. Green, The Insignificance of the Blaine Amendment, 2008 B.Y.U. L. REV. 295,
311–12 (2008) (discussing New York State’s decisions in 1824 and 1830 to deny a Baptist school and a
Methodist school state funding, and an 1827 Massachusetts law prohibiting the same).
72. MICH. CONST. OF 1835, art. I, §§ 4, 5. See also Ballotpedia, Blaine Amendments in State Constitutions, https://perma.cc/DYG2-Y6VF (last visited Dec. 23, 2020).
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desire to prevent government entanglement in religion and to decrease
“competition” for school funding.74 However, some states’ motives shifted
by the 1850s, when conflict emerged between a growing Catholic population and the Protestant majority.75 In 1875, James Blaine, a congressperson
from Maine, introduced a constitutional amendment that prohibited state
funds from supporting religious schools.76 Congressman Blaine introduced
the amendment to combat rising tensions—mainly centering on education—between Catholics and Protestants.77 At the time, public schools were
immersed in the Protestant tradition, and Catholic parents did not want their
children to be subjected to Protestant teachings.78 Catholic parents and religious leaders sought government funding to establish Catholic schools and
provide Catholic children with a parochial education.79 Congressman
Blaine’s amendment reacted to this push for Catholic schools, but his
amendment failed to pass both houses of Congress.80 Despite failing at the
federal level, many states adopted their own version of a “Blaine Amendment” in their constitutions, including Montana.81
Although Montana’s first No-Aid Clause was rooted in anti-Catholic
sentiment, the provision was included in the 1972 Constitution for entirely
different reasons.82 At the 1972 Constitutional Convention, maintaining the
separation of religion and public education was crucial to the delegates.83
The delegates wanted the Montana Constitution to ensure that religious
schools would not receive public funds.84 The delegates acknowledged the
bigoted roots of Montana’s No-Aid Clause;85 however, they agreed the No73. See OHIO CONST. OF 1851, art. VI, § 2; OR. CONST. OF 1857, art. I, § 5; KAN. CONST. OF 1858,
art. VI, § 8 (1859).
74. Green, supra note 71, at 310–12, 315.
75. Jay S. Bybee & David W. Newton, Of Orphans and Vouchers: Nevada’s “Little Blaine Amendment” and the Future of Religious Participation in Public Programs, 2 NEV. L.J. 551, 554–55 (2002).
Schooling was not the only source of conflict. The anti-immigrant and anti-Catholic sentiment “seeped
into politics” and society as a whole. Michael P. Dougherty, Montana’s Constitutional Prohibition on
Aid to Sectarian Schools: “Badge of Bigotry” or National Model for the Separation of Church and
State?, 77 MONT. L. REV. 41, 44 (2016); Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State
Blaine Amendments: Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 551,
560 (2003).
76. Bybee & Newton, supra note 75, at 551–52, 557.
77. Id. at 554–55.
78. Dougherty, supra note 75, at 43.
79. Id.; DeForrest, supra note 75, at 560.
80. Dougherty, supra note 75, at 44.
81. Id. at 44–45. At statehood, Montana’s enabling act required that the state Constitution contained a provision prohibiting public funding for religious schools. Enabling Act of Feb. 22, 1889 §§ 4,
14, 25 Stat. 676, 677, 680.
82. 6 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT, supra note 69, at 2008–09, 2016–19.
83. Id. at 2008, 2012.
84. Id. at 2016–18.
85. Id. at 2010.
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Aid Clause was essential and voted to keep the provision in the new Constitution to ensure separation of church and state.86 Voters ratified the Constitution the same year by popular vote, approving the No-Aid Clause—Article X, Section 6.87
C. Rule 1 as a Remedy to the Program’s Constitutional Defect
The Legislature and the Department both recognized the Program implicated the No-Aid Clause. The Program is a unique tax credit, containing
many unprecedented provisions in Montana’s tax code. These provisions
and the Montana Constitution’s limitations prompted extensive litigation,
leading to a final resolution at the United States Supreme Court. This section first discusses the Program and its novel provisions, including the Department’s attempt to administer the Program in accordance with Montana’s
No-Aid Clause through Rule 1. The section then explores the litigation over
the Department’s promulgation of Rule 1 and the Montana Supreme
Court’s conclusion that the Program created an unconstitutional indirect
payment to religious schools. This section concludes with an overview of
the United States Supreme Court’s decision, holding Article X, Section 6
violated the Free Exercise Clause.
The statutory framework of the Program contains restrictions on who
can use the tax credit and who can benefit from the scholarships created by
the Program.88 Unlike other tax credits in the Montana tax code, the Program provides a dollar-for-dollar tax credit for donations to an SSO,89 caps
the tax credit at $3 million,90 and mandates it be administered in the Montana Constitution.91
Taxpayers, beneficiary students, and schools must follow the Program’s specific process. Under the statute, the tax credit is matched up to a
$150 donation,92 as long as the taxpayer has at least $150 in tax liability.93
When donating to an SSO, taxpayers cannot direct their donation to a spe86. Delegate Maurice Driscoll, a parent to children attending religious schools, explained the 1972
No-Aid Clause was meant to replace the “archaic” original provision. Id. at 2012, 2026. Other Catholic
delegates supported the measure as well, including Delegates Schlitz and McNeil (a Protestant with a
Catholic wife and children). Id. at 2012, 2016.
87. Tyler M. Stockton, Comment, Originalism and the Montana Constitution, 77 MONT. L. REV.
117, 124 (2016).
88. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-30-3101 to 15-30-3104, 15-30-3111 (2019).
89. Id. § 15-30-3111(1). Compare with § 15-30-2326 (college contribution tax credit); § 15-302366 (elderly care tax credit); § 15-31-131 (dependent care tax credit); § 15-30-2364 (adoption tax
credit).
90. Id. § 15-30-3111(5)(a).
91. Id. § 15-30-3101.
92. Id. § 15-30-3111(1).
93. Id. § 15-30-3111(3).
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cific student or school.94 Instead, after a taxpayer donates, the SSO “deliver[s] the scholarship funds directly to the qualified education provider” to
benefit the designated student.95 An SSO is limited to providing scholarships equal to or less than 50% of the “per-pupil average of total public
school expenditures.”96 The Program itself caps at $3 million but increases
by 10% for each year the cap is reached.97
The Montana Legislature also included a provision mandating that the
Department administer the Program in accordance with Article X, Section
6.98 The Legislature included this seemingly common-sense provision because it recognized that the Program’s characteristics and the fiscal impact
could implicate the No-Aid Clause. The Program’s unprecedented dollarfor-dollar tax credit and $3 million cap are characteristics more akin to a
direct spending measure than a tax expenditure. The calculated costs of the
Program include a potential $9.6 million decrease in revenue to the General
Fund and estimated direct costs of over $11 million by the fiscal year
2022.99 The effect of the Program on the state’s General Fund is estimated
to be over $20 million by 2022.100
Because of the Program’s structure and cost, the Department found
that it unconstitutionally appropriated indirect aid in violation of Article X,
Section 6 of the Montana Constitution.101 To cure these constitutional defects, the Department adopted Rule 1.102 It reasoned that the Program violated the No-Aid Clause because it subsidized religious schools by providing an offsetting tax credit for donations to the SSO.103 Further, the Program’s economic effect on the General Fund was substantial.104 Rule 1 redefined “Qualified Education Provider” to exclude religiously affiliated
94. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-30-3111(1); § 15-30-3103(1)(b).
95. Id. § 15-30-3104(1).
96. Id. § 15-30-3103(1)(d); § 15-30-3104(2).
97. Id. § 15-30-3111(5)(a).
98. Id. § 15-30-3101.
99. Fiscal Note, supra note 40, at 2; Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 435 P.3d 603, 617 n.3
(Mont. 2018).
100. Fiscal Note, supra note 40, at 2.
101. Notice of Public Hearing, Montana Administrative Register Notice 42-2-939 (Oct. 15, 2015).
102. ADMIN. R. MONT. 42.4.802. Rule 1 provides that a “qualified education provider . . . may not
be: (a) a church, school, academy, seminary, college, university, literary or scientific institution, or any
other sectarian institution owned or controlled in whole or in part by any church, religious sect, or
denomination; or (b) an individual who is employed by a church, school, academy, seminary, college,
university, literary or scientific institution, or any other sectarian institution owned or controlled in
whole or in part by any church, religious sect, or denomination when providing those services.”
103. See Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Espinoza v. Montana
Dep’t of Revenue, 2016 WL 11608964 (D. Mont. Jul. 8, 2016) (No. DV-15-1152A) (illustrating the
Department’s position regarding the Program without Rule 1).
104. Fiscal Note, supra note 40, at 2.
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schools from receiving aid, narrowing the Program to allow only secular
schools to participate.105
Parents of children attending Stillwater Christian School sued the Department, seeking an injunction preventing Rule 1 from being enforced.106
Plaintiffs Espinoza, Anderson, and Schaefer argued the tax credit was not
an indirect appropriation or payment in violation of the Montana Constitution, and that the Department had acted improperly.107 Plaintiffs also argued
Rule 1 violated the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the United
States and Montana Constitutions.108
The Department responded, arguing the tax credit created an indirect
payment to religious schools in violation of Montana’s No-Aid Clause.109
Highlighting that the Program mandates SSOs pay the tax credit scholarship
directly to the recipient school, the Department argued an indirect payment
“directly benefit[s] the school.”110 The Department asserted the Program
could only be implemented constitutionally with Rule 1 and Rule 1’s limitation on Qualified Education Providers was constitutional under the First
Amendment’s Religion Clauses.111
The district court granted Plaintiffs’ injunction, finding the tax credit
was not an appropriation or payment, and that the Program was constitutional without Rule 1.112 The court held tax credits were not money in the
treasury, and the Legislature was not expending public funds, so the tax
credit was not an appropriation or payment subject to Article X, Section 6
of the Montana Constitution.113
The Department appealed the district court’s ruling, arguing the court
erred in finding the tax credit was not an indirect payment.114 It asked the
Montana Supreme Court to consider whether the No-Aid Clause required
Rule 1 and whether the Department could enact it.115 In response, the parents argued that the tax credit was not a direct or indirect appropriation or
payment and that the tax credit did not aid religious schools.116
105. ADMIN. R. MONT. 42.4.802.
106. Complaint ¶¶ 7–9, 140 Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 2015 WL 13821199 (D. Mont.
Dec. 16, 2015) (No. DV-15-1152).
107. Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of their Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Espinoza v. Montana.
Dep’t of Revenue, 2016 WL 11608960 (D. Mont. Jan. 29, 2016) (No. DV-15-1152A).
108. Id.
109. Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 103.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 435 P.3d 603, 608 (Mont. 2018).
113. Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 103.
114. Brief for Appellants at 1–2, 7–8, Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 2018 WL 949265
(Mont. Feb. 12, 2018) (No. DA 17-0492).
115. Id. at 1–2.
116. Appellees’ Answer Brief at 9–10, Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 2018 WL 7351707
(Mont. Jan. 19, 2018) (No. DA 17-0492).
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1. Montana Supreme Court
The Montana Supreme Court held the Program was unconstitutional
under Article X, Section 6, because the Program allowed the Legislature to
indirectly aid religious schools by providing a tax credit for scholarship
donations.117 Noting the Montana No-Aid Clause’s strength, the Court
found the Program allowed the Legislature to indirectly pay tuition for children attending religiously affiliated schools.118
The Court explained that the tax credit created by the Program was a
subsidy, and thus an indirect payment to religious schools because it allowed parents to receive a dollar-for-dollar reduction in their taxes for their
donation to an SSO.119 Further, the Program provided parents with a $150
reduction in tuition burden when their child received a scholarship from an
SSO.120 The tax credit combined with the reduction in tuition burden allowed the Legislature to “indirectly pay[ ] tuition at private, religiouslyaffiliated schools.”121 Because the vast majority of the Qualified Education
Providers were religiously affiliated and taxpayers could not direct funds to
a specific school, there was no way the Legislature could ensure the indirect
funds were not going to a religious school.122 If the funds did end up at a
religious school, the majority explained, there was no way to know “where
the secular purpose ended, and the sectarian began.”123
In support of its holding, the Court discussed the Montana No-Aid
Clause’s history and the intent of its drafters.124 Although the Montana
Constitution has contained a No-Aid Clause since statehood, the Court
pointed to the 1972 Constitutional Convention, where the provision was
ratified in Montana’s new Constitution.125 The Court explained that the delegates had manifested a clear intent that no aid—direct or indirect—should
flow from the state to sectarian schools.126 The delegates’ purpose in including the No-Aid Clause was not bigotry but to prevent “religious entanglement” in public education.127
Justice Gustafson concurred with the majority to expand on the
Court’s tax expenditure analysis and to explain why the Program violated
117. Espinoza, 435 P.3d at 612–13, 615.
118. Id. at 612.
119. Id. at 612–13.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 612.
122. Id. at 613.
123. Id. at 611, 613 (citing State ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. No. 10 of Deer Lodge Cty., 472 P.2d
1013, 1021 (Mont. 1970)).
124. Id. at 611–15.
125. Id. at 610; see also MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6(1).
126. Espinoza, 435 P.3d at 610.
127. Id.
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both Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.128 She reasoned the Program violated the Establishment Clause because the Program denied taxpayers the ability to choose whether their funds supported a religious
school.129 She also asserted the Program violated the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment because taxpayers were forced to support religious
schools to receive the tax credit.130 She agreed with the majority’s holding
that the Program constituted an indirect payment and explained how the tax
credit diverted funds from the General Fund.131 Her analysis of the Program
showed how the “economic effect” of the tax credit is to give aid “directly
to the [religious] school[s].”132
Justice Baker raised two concerns with the majority’s opinion. She argued characterizing a tax credit as an indirect payment was a “diverg[ence]”
from the language of the Constitution.133 She also explained that a tax
credit cannot be an indirect payment because the Program “diverts” the
money before it becomes public funds.134 Additionally, Justice Baker critiqued the majority for not analyzing the Program under the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment, arguing an analysis under both the Montana and United States Constitutions was needed to justify the majority’s
elimination of the Program in its entirety.135
The parents appealed the Montana Supreme Court’s decision to the
United States Supreme Court136 and were granted certiorari.137
2. United States Supreme Court
On appeal, the Petitioners argued the Montana Supreme Court invalidated the Program under the Montana Constitution in violation of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause.138 The Petitioners asserted the Montana Supreme
Court’s application of the No-Aid Clause violated the Free Exercise Clause
128. Id. at 617–21 (Gustafson, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 620–21 (Gustafson, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 621.
131. Id. at 617.
132. Id. at 618.
133. Id. at 627 (Baker, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 626–30.
135. Id. Justice Rice dissented as well, foreshadowing the United States Supreme Court’s decision.
He argued the Program was constitutional under both the Montana and United States Constitutions
because the Program benefited the children and families who received the scholarship, not the religious
organizations. Further, he disagreed with the majority’s characterization of tax credits as public funds.
136. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue (U.S. Mar. 12, 2019)
(No. 18-1195).
137. Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 139 S. Ct. 2777 (2019) (granting certiorari).
138. Brief for Petitioners’ at 13, Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue (U.S. Sept. 11, 2019) (No.
18-1195).
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by discriminating against the parents’ and schools’ religious beliefs, conduct, and status.139 The Petitioners pointed to the origins of the No-Aid
Clause and argued that, because it was enacted out of animus toward
Catholics, its application violated the Equal Protection Clause.140
The Department focused its argument on the Free Exercise Clause.141
Because the Montana Supreme Court’s decision eliminated the Program,
the Department argued that Qualified Education Providers and students
were not forced to choose between their religious affiliation or receiving
funding.142 The Department also argued Montana’s No-Aid Clause did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause because it was enacted to protect religious freedom and maintain separation of church and state.143
The majority reversed the Montana Supreme Court’s decision and held
that Article X, Section 6 violated the Free Exercise Clause.144 The majority
found the Montana Supreme Court’s decision improperly turned on the religious status of the schools seeking aid under the Program.145
Briefly addressing the Establishment Clause, the majority found the
Program, without Rule 1, was indeed constitutional.146 The Program neutrally benefitted both religious schools and secular schools, and it aided
religious schools only because of a parent’s independent choice.147 As a
result, the Program did not violate the Establishment Clause.148
Next, the majority analyzed the Montana Supreme Court’s application
of Article X, Section 6 under the Free Exercise Clause.149 The Free Exercise Clause prohibits a state from denying a person or religious organization
a public benefit “solely because of their religious character.”150 The majority explained programs that require schools and parents to “divorce” themselves from their religious affiliation to receive state benefits are “odious to
our Constitution” and are strictly prohibited.151 Further, the majority found
the Montana Supreme Court’s application of Article X, Section 6 “turn[ed]
expressly on religious status and not religious use,” in violation of the Free
139. Id. at 17–20.
140. Id. at 44–45.
141. Brief of Respondents’ at 10–49, Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue (U.S. Nov. 8, 2019)
(No. 18-1195).
142. Id. at 10–49.
143. Id. at 17–36.
144. Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2255–56, 2263 (2020).
145. Id. at 2256.
146. Id. at 2254.
147. Id. at 2253 (citing Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012,
2019–20 (2017); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 719 (2004); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,
649–53 (2002)).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 2254.
150. Id. at 2255 (citing Trinity Lutheran, 1374 S. Ct. at 2021).
151. Id. at 2255–56 (citing Trinity Lutheran, 1374 S. Ct. at 2025).
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Exercise Clause.152 The title and text of Montana’s No-Aid Clause153
“bar[red] religious schools from public benefits solely because of the religious character of the schools.”154 Likewise, parents seeking benefits for
their children’s education at a religious school were prohibited from using
the aid only because of the education’s religious character.155
Distinguishing its reasoning from Locke, the majority highlighted that
the program in Locke turned on religious use, not religious status.156 Unlike
the Program, which denied aid based on an institution’s religious status, in
Locke, Washington State “merely” chose not to fund the training of a minister—an “essentially religious endeavor.”157 Locke was denied aid because
of how he chose to use the funds, not because of his religious status.158
Further, the majority explained that Washington State had a “historic
and substantial” interest in not funding clerical training, while Montana had
no similar interest in not funding religious schools.159 Unlike providing
state aid to train clergy, the majority explained that states and the federal
government funded religious schools in the 1700s and 1800s.160 Additionally, Montana’s No-Aid Clause was “born of bigotry” toward Catholics.161
Thus, the majority found Montana had no “historic and substantial” interest
in barring religious schools from receiving state aid.162
The majority applied strict scrutiny to the Montana Supreme Court’s
application of the No-Aid Clause because the decision turned on religious
status.163 The Department argued the Montana Supreme Court had three
compelling state interests in denying religious schools aid: (1) stricter separation of church and state;164 (2) promoting religious freedom by protecting
taxpayers’ rights not to fund religious groups;165 and (3) supporting public
152. Id. at 2256.
153. Article X, Section 6 is titled: Aid prohibited to sectarian schools. The provision provides that
“[t]he legislature, counties, cities, towns, school districts, and public corporations shall not make any
direct or indirect appropriation or payment from any public fund or monies, or any grant of lands or
other property for any sectarian purpose or to aid any church, school, academy, seminary, college,
university, or other literary or scientific institution, controlled in whole or in part by any church, sect, or
denomination.” MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6(1).
154. Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2255.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 2257.
157. Id. (citing Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721 (2004)).
158. Id. (citing Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2023–24
(2017)).
159. Id. at 2258.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 2259.
162. Id. at 2258–59.
163. Id. at 2260.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 2260–61.
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education.166 The majority found none of these reasons to be compelling.167
As to the first and second interests, promoting religious freedom by infringing on others’ rights is not a compelling state interest.168 The third interest,
protecting public schools, was not compelling either, because only religious
schools were barred from receiving aid, not all private schools.169
Finally, the majority held the Montana Supreme Court’s decision to
invalidate the entire program did not remedy any potential violation of the
Religion Clauses.170 Because the Montana Supreme Court based its decision on a constitutional provision that “expressly discriminates on the basis
of religious status,” it was irrelevant that the entire program was eliminated.171
Three Justices concurred with the majority, each concurring to elaborate on their views of the Religion Clauses.172 Three Justices dissented,
writing to criticize the majority for reaching the constitutionality of Article
X, Section 6 and arguing the majority wrongly expanded the Free Exercise
Clause’s mandate.173
By overturning the Montana Supreme Court’s decision and finding
that Article X, Section 6 of the Montana Constitution violated the Free Exercise Clause, the Roberts Court expanded its Free Exercise jurisprudence.
Advancing its reasoning in Trinity Lutheran, the Supreme Court in Espinoza limited even more the amount of “play in the joints” between the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses, narrowing the circumstances under
which a state can bar a religious organization from receiving state aid.
166. Id. at 2261.
167. Id. at 2260–61.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 2261.
170. Id. at 2261–62.
171. Id. at 2262.
172. Justice Thomas concurred to explain he believes the Establishment Clause only applies against
the Federal Government, not the states, and that the Clause is only meant to prohibit coercion of orthodoxy or financial support of a religious group by force of law or threat of penalty. Id. at 2263–65
(Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Gorsuch also concurred, arguing that discrimination under the Free
Exercise Clause should not turn on religious use or religious status, but instead on whether a “condition
on a public benefit discriminates against the free exercise of religion.” Id. at 2278 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Justice Alito concurred to provide additional background on the biased origins of no-aid clauses in
state constitutions. Id. at 2267–74 (Alito, J., concurring).
173. Justice Ginsburg dissented to argue that the majority “had no call” to address the constitutionality of Montana’s No-Aid Clause because the petitioners “disavowed a facial . . . challenge,” and because
the Montana Supreme Court never addressed the provision’s constitutionality. Id. at 2280–81 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting). Justice Sotomayor dissented for similar reasons, arguing the majority impermissibly “reframe[d] the case” to find Article X, Section 6 invalid. Id. at 2292–93 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Justice Sotomayor also argued the majority’s reading of the Free Exercise Clause to require states to
fund religious activity was in error. Id. at 2283. Justice Breyer dissented on similar grounds. Id. at
2282–83 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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III. TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS
Although the United States Supreme Court overturned the Montana
Supreme Court’s decision, the Montana Supreme Court’s holding that a tax
credit is an indirect payment still stands.174 This part discusses the Montana
Supreme Court’s analysis and explains why the Montana Supreme Court’s
holding was correct. First, this part provides background on tax expenditures, explaining how they function, the purpose they serve, and how they
differ from direct appropriations. Next, this part outlines the many criticisms of current tax expenditure policy. Finally, this part argues that the
Montana Supreme Court’s analysis—defining a tax credit as an indirect
payment—accurately reflects tax expenditures’ true nature and should be
the predominant view.
A. What is a Tax Expenditure?
A tax expenditure is a provision that decreases the tax liability of an
individual or entity, which, in turn, decreases the tax revenue the state
would have otherwise collected from the taxpayer.175 A tax expenditure is a
government subsidy,176 and after receiving the benefit, the taxpayer has
more money in its pocket because its tax liability has been reduced.177 Tax
expenditures come in many forms, including deductions, exclusions, preferential rates, and credits.178 The most valuable tax expenditure for a taxpayer
is a dollar-for-dollar tax credit because the taxpayer receives a one-to-one
deduction in his or her tax liability for engaging in the activity the tax credit
encourages.179
Tax expenditures are an important fiscal tool for policymakers.180 Tax
expenditures allow policymakers to incentivize behavior, and they provide
a less cumbersome avenue for appropriating funding.181 A legislative body
can encourage specific behavior from taxpayers by providing a financial
174. Id. at 2254 (majority opinion).
175. MONT. CODE ANN. § 5-4-104(2) (2019) (defining “tax expenditures” as “those revenue losses
attributable to provisions of Montana tax laws that allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction
from gross income or that provide a special credit”).
176. MCMAHON, supra note 22, at 474.
177. Christopher Howard, Testing the Tools Approach: Tax Expenditures versus Direct Expenditures, 55 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 439, 440 (1995).
178. Where is the Money Going?, supra note 26.
179. MCMAHON, supra note 22, at 479.
180. See generally MCMAHON, supra note 22, at 473–75.
181. JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER
TAXES 169 (4th ed. 2008); MCMAHON, supra note 22, at 473. See also National Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 567 (2012) (quoting JOSEPH STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES § 962, 434 (1833) (“The taxing power is often, very often, applied for other purposes, than revenue.”)).
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incentive through a tax expenditure.182 For example, Congress and state
legislatures incentivize taxpayers to invest in capital assets and markets by
providing a preferential rate on long-term capital gains.183 The Montana
Legislature, in enacting the Program, also encouraged specific behavior by
creating a mechanism to lower the cost of a private school education.184
The dollar-for-dollar tax credit and promise of a tuition reduction made it
more affordable to send children to private schools and therefore encouraged parents to do so.185
Tax expenditures also provide a less cumbersome way to appropriate
funds. Unlike direct spending,186 tax expenditures do not require administrative spending programs.187 Tax expenditures are administered through
the state’s Department of Revenue or, on the federal side, through the Internal Revenue Service.188 Tax agencies have a preexisting infrastructure,
making it easier for the agency to run a tax expenditure program
smoothly.189 Tax expenditures face fewer hurdles than direct spending measures do during the legislative process as well.190 Most programs, once
passed, are not reviewed regularly.191 Tax expenditures also are not required to undergo the extensive appropriations process, because they are
often treated as tax cuts instead of appropriations.192
For these reasons, tax expenditures are a widely popular alternative to
direct spending. Tax expenditures are currently the “dominant instruments
for implementing new discretionary spending policies” at the federal
level.193 In Montana, between 2016 and 2017, tax expenditures led to a
182. Frank Sammartino & Eric Toder, Tax Expenditure Basics 4, TAX POLICY CENTER (Jan. 22,
2020), https://perma.cc/PU44-8R2D.
183. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 181, at 280.
184. Fiscal Note, supra note 40, at 2–3 (explaining the decrease in tuition attributable to availability
is estimated to result in a private school enrollment increase of 403 students by 2018).
185. See Testimony of Sen. Llew Jones, Hearing on SB 410 Before the Sen. Comm. on Finance and
Claims, 2015 Leg., 64th Sess., at 17:11:00–17:13:00 (testifying that the bill would “enhance student
opportunity,” and increase the number of educational options “on the menu”); see also Fiscal Note,
supra note 40, at 2–3.
186. Direct spending occurs when a legislative body passes a bill to expend money from the state’s
treasury. An executive can also directly spend money through his or her emergency spending powers.
Congressional Research Service, Spending and Tax Expenditures: Distinctions and Major Programs, at
1, https://perma.cc/H997-YLNN (last visited Oct. 31, 2020).
187. Id. at 3–4.
188. Edward Kleinbard, The Congress Within the Congress: How Tax Expenditures Distort Our
Budget and Our Political Processes, 36 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 1, 16 (2010).
189. Id. at 16; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 182, at 169.
190. Kleinbard, supra note 188 at 21–22; Congressional Research Service, supra note 186, at 3–4.
191. Congressional Research Service, supra note 186, at 3–4.
192. Sammartino & Toder, supra note 182, at 4.
193. Kleinbard, supra note 188, at 3; MCMAHON, supra note 22, at 774–75.
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$300 million decrease in state revenue.194 This is equivalent to approximately 12% of the state’s General Fund revenue for the fiscal year 2018.195
Although tax expenditures and direct spending measures differ in
form, the effect of both provisions is the same—less money in the treasury.196 Unlike direct spending, however, a tax expenditure gives the appearance of a “tax cut.”197 Still, the result is identical.
B. Criticisms of Tax Expenditures
Many experts criticize policymakers for their heavy reliance on tax
expenditures.198 Tax expenditures lack the same transparency and review
that direct spending measures face, weaken markets, and obscure government size.199 This subpart discusses each criticism in turn and addresses
those that are particularly relevant in Montana.
1. Legislative Scrutiny
First, tax expenditures are subject to less scrutiny than direct spending. Direct spending is subject to each legislative session’s appropriation
process, where each appropriation is thoroughly examined and debated.201
Tax expenditures, on the other hand, are typically not reexamined each legislative session.202 Although some tax expenditures do sunset after a specified period, the majority are permanent.203 The costs of these tax expenditures are not reviewed under customary budgeting processes each legislative session and become “silent spending” provisions, flying under the radar
of legislative scrutiny.204
200

194. Where is the Money Going?, supra note 26.
195. Id.
196. Biennial Report, supra note 26, at 275, 281–82; see also Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v.
Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1456–57 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
197. MCMAHON, supra note 22, at 474.
198. Kleinbard, supra note 188, at 16–22.
199. Sammartino & Toder, supra note 182, at 4.
200. Leachman, Grundman & Johnson, supra note 23; What Are Tax Expenditures?, supra note 27.
201. Leachman, Grundman & Johnson, supra note 23; What Are Tax Expenditures?, supra note 27.
202. Kleinbard, supra note 188, at 21–22 (discussing federal tax expenditures); Leachman, Grundman & Johnson, supra note 201 (discussing state tax expenditures).
203. Where is the Money Going?, supra note 26; Kleinbard, supra note 188, at 21–22 (discussing
federal tax expenditures); Leachman, Grundman & Johnson, supra note 23 (discussing state tax expenditures).
204. Where is the Money Going?, supra note 26.
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2. Market Distortion
Second, many tax expenditures, especially tax credits, can create negative externalities in the economy.205 When a government provides a tax
incentive for a specific industry, the “intended effect” is to increase the
production and consumption of the industry’s goods.206 This disrupts the
free market and can lead to an inefficient allocation of resources.207 Further,
to account for the decrease in revenue, a government may impose a higher
tax rate on other industries that were not as successful in lobbying for a tax
incentive.208 Each subsidy must be met with a tax rate increase or a decrease in spending; either way, a tax expenditure creates “a penalty for
someone else.”209 This leads to further economic distortion, increasing
deadweight loss—the societal cost of market inefficiency attributable to
higher taxes.210
3. Obfuscation of the Size of Government
Third, the use of tax expenditures distorts the size and scope of the
government.211 Because a government does not reflect tax expenditures in
its annual or bi-annual budget, the costs of a government’s activities become obfuscated.212 When a government enacts a tax expenditure, rather
than treating it as a spending mechanism, which would require a line item
and administrative spending program, legislators promote the expenditure
as a tax cut.213 Legislators get to pat themselves on the back for decreasing
taxpayers’ tax burdens and for supporting a “smaller government.”214 In
reality, the opposite is true.215 A tax expenditure is an increase in discretionary spending, and, over time, these subsidies create a larger, more complex government.216
205. Kleinbard, supra note 188, at 8. But see SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 181, at 169.
206. Kleinbard, supra note 188, at 8.
207. Id. See also MCMAHON, supra note 22, at 482. Free market economists believe the market
allocates resources effectively. When an industry is incentivized through a tax credit to create more of a
specific good, that industry is no longer responding to market forces and as a result, may create a
surplus.
208. Kleinbard, supra note 188, at 8–9.
209. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 181, at 217; see also MCMAHON, supra note 22, at 475.
210. Mark Lester L. Aure, Deadweight Loss and Taxation, 24 NTRC TAX RES. J. 1 (2012), https://
perma.cc/KV57-EJLS; Mirit Eyal-Cohen, The Cost of Inexperience, 69 ALLR 859, 907–08 (2018).
211. Kleinbard, supra note 188, at 21; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 181, at 216–17; MCMAHON,
supra note 22, at 477.
212. Leachman, Grundman & Johnson, supra note 23; Biennial Report, supra note 26, at 275.
213. Biennial Report, supra note 26, at 275; MCMAHON, supra note 22, at 474.
214. Kleinbard, supra note 188, at 18.
215. Biennial Report, supra note 26, at 275; MCMAHON, supra note 22, at 474.
216. Kleinbard, supra note 188, at 18, 21; Sammartino & Toder, supra note 182, at 4; MCMAHON,
supra note 22, at 474.
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The spending effect of tax expenditures is especially true in state governments, like Montana, where the legislature is constitutionally mandated
to balance each legislative session’s budget.217 Unlike the federal government, where Congress can run a deficit, the Montana Legislature must offset each direct expenditure.218 When the Montana Legislature passes a tax
credit or provides other tax benefits, it decreases the treasury’s amount of
revenue. The Montana Legislature must offset that decrease in revenue with
either an increase in taxes, or a cut in spending.219
The Montana Legislature has acknowledged that tax expenditures and
direct spending are both appropriation mechanisms affecting the state’s bottom line.220 The definition of “State Expenditures” includes “money appropriated for tax relief,” showing that the Legislature recognizes that a tax
expenditure is a form of government subsidy.221 The Legislature has also
enacted programs that treat tax expenditures and direct payments equivalently. For example, the now repealed Insure Montana Program created a
health insurance pool for small businesses222 and allowed a business to
choose whether to receive a direct payment or a tax credit to offset its tax
liability.223 By giving beneficiaries a choice between a tax credit or a direct
payment, the Legislature recognized that the result was the same—a government subsidy for the beneficiary. Despite the Legislature’s recognition
that the spending mechanisms lead to the same effect, direct spending and
tax expenditures are still considered differently.
4. Government Transparency
Fourth, tax expenditures hinder one of the mainstays of democracy—
public discourse, debate, and transparency.224 Most tax expenditures automatically renew each year and do not come before the Legislature during
the appropriations process.225 Unlike direct spending, a tax expenditure is
often only subject to debate and voting by legislators at its enactment, yet
they continue to appropriate funds like direct spending measures.226 These
217. Appropriations by the legislature shall not exceed anticipated revenue. MONT. CONST. art. 8,
§ 9.
218. Id.
219. Biennial Report, supra note 26, at 275.
220. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 17-7-502(3) (2019), listing laws that contain statutory appropriations.
The Program is included in this list.
221. Id. § 17-8-105(g).
222. Id. § 33-22-2001, repealed by Laws 2017, ch. 151, § 54, eff. Oct. 1, 2017. (view at https://
perma.cc/X5QR-3EMJ).
223. MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-22-2006, repealed by Laws 2017, ch. 151, § 54, eff. Oct. 1, 2017.
224. Leachman, Grundman & Johnson, supra note 23.
225. MCMAHON, supra note 22, at 481.
226. Kleinbard, supra note 188, at 21.
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provisions bypass the traditional appropriations process put in place to ensure the people dictate how their tax dollars are spent.227 Further, tax expenditures typically exist within a complex tax code and are not easily visible to reporters, politicians, and constituents.228 This leads to a lack of
transparency in both the appropriations process and the tax code, and makes
it difficult for the provisions to face outside scrutiny.229
Governments have worked to clarify the tax expenditure process in
recent years. The federal government and 44 state governments provide
yearly tax expenditure reports, which describe each expenditure, identify
provision costs, and identify the number of taxpayers using it.230 Montana
publishes a biennial tax expenditure report—“one of the most thorough in
the nation.”231 However, this is only because the Department of Revenue
chooses to include more information than mandated by statute.232 Recently,
the Legislature has also mandated additional review for tax credit programs.
House Bill 723, passed in 2019, requires the interim revenue committee to
review specific tax credits for each biennium until 2027.233 Along with the
tax expenditure budget, this provision helps increase transparency with tax
expenditures,234 but these measures are not enough. To make substantive
change, tax expenditures must be considered and treated as government
subsidies that indirectly appropriate state funds.
C. Tax Expenditures are Indirect Payments
The Montana Supreme Court’s interpretation of a tax credit correctly
reflects a tax credit’s true nature as a subsidy, and therefore as a payment.235 The Montana Supreme Court’s decision recognized that the fiscal
impact of providing a tax credit is no different from the Legislature appropriating tax dollars and directly paying schools to provide scholarships for
private school students.236 All legislative bodies should follow the Montana
227. MCMAHON, supra note 22, at 481.
228. Id.; Kleinbard, supra note 188, at 21.
229. MCMAHON, supra note 22, at 475–78, 484; Kleinbard, supra note 188, at 21–22.
230. Where is the Money Going?, supra note 26; Leachman, Grundman & Johnson, supra note 23.
231. Where is the Money Going?, supra note 26.
232. Compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-1-205(3) with Biennial Report, supra note 26, at 287–360.
233. Id. § 15-30-2303; Where is the Money Going?, supra note 26. Additionally, § 5-4-104(1) “encourages” the legislature to “provide an explicit purpose of a tax expenditure” and to “terminat[e]” the
provisions within “6 years” of enactment. Most provisions do not follow this suggestion, however. See
§ 15-30-2301 (capital gains credit); § 15-30-2131 (deductions from net income); § 15-30-2318 (earned
income tax credit).
234. Where is the Money Going?, supra note 26.
235. See Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1450 (2011) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting, explaining that “[c]ash grants and targeted tax breaks are means of accomplishing the same
government objective—to provide financial support to select individuals or organizations”).
236. Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 435 P.3d, 612–13 (Mont. 2018).
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Supreme Court’s lead and treat tax credits and other tax expenditures as
government subsidies. As the Montana Supreme Court’s analysis shows,
subjecting tax expenditures to the same scrutiny as direct spending measures explains who and what the provision benefits and ensures the Legislature acts constitutionally.
In the majority opinion, the Montana Supreme Court draws a direct
line from the Program to the religious schools that benefit from it, showing
how the Legislature sought to use a tax expenditure to bypass constitutional
prohibitions.237 The Program is a tax replacement program and “permits the
Legislature to indirectly pay [for] tuition” at private religious schools
through the dollar-for-dollar tax credit.238 Parents who donate to an SSO
receive both a 100% offset of their tax liability and an equal decrease in
their tuition obligation.239 In other words, after a parent has received the tax
credit, their tuition burden is decreased by $150 at no cost to them.240 The
state, and other taxpayers, carry the economic incidence of a portion of the
tuition, rather than the parent.241
A direct payment program providing scholarships to religious schools
would have violated Article X, Section 6, yet the Program, a tax expenditure, yielded the same result.242 The Legislature, by enacting a dollar-fordollar tax credit program, “involved itself” in charitable giving to religious
schools and “encourage[d]” it.243 As Justice McKinnon acknowledged, the
Program allowed the Legislature to “subsidize” the cost of religious education244 and excessively entangled the state with religious schools—exactly
what Article X, Section 6 sought to prevent.245
In Justice Baker’s dissent, she disagreed with the majority’s holding
that the Program created an indirect payment, violating the No-Aid
Clause.246 While she acknowledged that the majority’s “indirect impact”
theory “may be correct,” she criticized the majority’s reading of the No-Aid
Clause, arguing that it “diverge[d] from the constitutional text.”247 She also
argued that only the Executive Branch can make a payment, not the Legis237. Id. at 612–14.
238. Id. at 612.
239. Id. Although the parent is donating and receiving a tuition decrease through a third party SSO,
the Court explained that “an indirect payment still exists.”
240. Id.
241. Id. at 613. But See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 181, at 217; MCMAHON, supra note 22, at
475.
242. Espinoza, 435 P.3d at 613.
243. Id. at 612.
244. Id. at 613.
245. Id. at 613–14.
246. Id. at 626–30 (Baker, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 627.
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lature.248 Finally, she asserted that the majority’s interpretation of “payment” deviated from the 1972 Constitutional delegates’ intent.249 For these
reasons, Justice Baker characterized the Program as an “indirect transfer of
benefit” instead of an indirect payment.250
Although Justice Baker’s reading of Article X, Section 6 has merit, her
dissent fails to recognize that the Program provides a government subsidy
for private, mostly religious, education. This economic impact is exactly
what the No-Aid Clause sought to prevent. The majority acknowledged the
Program’s actual fiscal impact by defining the provision as an indirect payment. Unlike a direct spending measure, a tax expenditure “diverts” tax
revenue before it reaches the general fund.251 Rather than collecting tax
revenue and spending those funds on a religious school, the Program allows
the Legislature to skip the government middleman.252 Taxpayers instead
“assign a portion of [their] tax liability” to an SSO, where the money will
directly aid religious schools.253 The Program could divert $9.6 million in
tax revenue by fiscal year 2022.254
The economic cost of tax expenditures is not limited to diverted tax
revenue. These provisions also create administrative costs, which further
contribute to tax expenditures’ direct effect on state budgets. The Program,
aside from diverting tax revenue from the General Fund, comes with its
own direct costs.255 The fiscal note accompanying Senate Bill 410 outlined
these administrative costs, including hiring two FTE employees at the Department, and one FTE at the Office of Public Instruction to administer the
program.256 The Legislature also earmarked $3 million for “the anticipated
revenue shortfall” the Program caused in its first year.257 These costs are
not illusory—they are accompanied by either an increase in taxes, or a decrease in state services to balance the state’s budget.258
Like all tax expenditures, the Program comes at a real cost to the
state’s General Fund and, as a result, to Montana taxpayers and citizens.
While politicians treat tax expenditures as free money to the taxpayer benefitting from the provision, this is not the case. In reality, fellow taxpayers
are left to pick up the check. Additionally, state services available to citi248. Id. at 626.
249. Id. at 628.
250. Id. at 627–28.
251. Id. at 616–17 (Gustafson, J., concurring).
252. Id. at 616.
253. Id. at 617.
254. Fiscal Note, supra note 40, at 5.
255. Id. at 2; see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 17-7-502(3) (2019), listing laws that contain statutory
appropriations. The Program is included in this list.
256. Fiscal Note, supra note 40, at 4.
257. Espinoza, 435 P.3d at 617 (Gustafson, J., concurring).
258. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 181, at 217; see also MCMAHON, supra note 22, 475.
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zens may face cuts because of a fall in revenue, impacting the most vulnerable Montanans. The Montana Supreme Court recognized the fiscal impact
of tax expenditure programs and appropriately treated the Program as an
indirect appropriation to accurately reflect its impact. Instead of allowing
tax expenditures to silently drain the general fund year after year, legislative
bodies and courts should follow the Montana Supreme Court’s lead and
treat these programs as payments, receiving the same heightened scrutiny
and analysis as direct spending measures.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the United States Supreme Court overturned the bulk of the
Montana Supreme Court’s decision in Espinoza, the Court’s inclusion of a
tax credit under the indirect payment umbrella will have a lasting effect on
the state. The Court’s analysis demonstrates a shift in thinking surrounding
tax expenditure spending, which will lead, in time, to more accountable and
transparent government spending.
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